In 1962, Peter F. Strawson concluded his hallmark essay “Freedom and Resentment” with the remark that in the end something like the optimist view—sufficiently radically modified—on personal responsibility is the right one. With this he had in mind the view that our everyday practices of responsibility keep their raison d’être even if free will (in the libertarian sense of the concept) would be an illusion. According to Strawson, optimist views appeal to the beneficial consequences to our society of our concepts and practices of responsibility. Pessimists, on the other hand, are morally indignant about the suggestion that beneficial consequences sufficiently justify our practices. Strawson pointed out that this reaction itself discloses how deeply rooted our natural reactive attitudes to one another are, and suggested that the whole metaphysical debate on the issue of free will and personal responsibility should take this as its point of departure. The quest for a justification of ascribing personal responsibility to one another can only be understood from within the practice in which we approach each other as responsible agents. Philosophers as Susan Wolf and Jay Wallace have taken up the challenge and developed views in which our mundane ability to respond to reasons prominently figures in the justification of our everyday ascriptions of moral responsibility.

Almost half a century later developments in the BCN sciences provide reason to rethink the nature, value and possibility of consequentialist justifications of our everyday practices of moral responsibility. Empirical findings such as reported by Benjamin Libet, Michael Gazzaniga and Daniel Wegner have raised doubts about both the existence of libertarian free will and our ability to act for reasons. However very few of the people who doubt these abilities are ready to accept the conclusion that we should abandon or radically change our everyday practices of moral responsibility. This might indicate a widespread attraction to consequentialist justifications of those practices. For this workshop we invite (1) papers that reflect on the resistance to abandonment or revisionism of our everyday practices, as well as (2) papers critically discussing consequentialist justifications of those practices.

Suitable topics include:

the nature, possibility and desirability of consequentialist justifications of our practices of responsibility

the scope and function of our practices of moral responsibility

comparisons of consequentialist views, their problems and solutions

defenses and criticisms of specific consequentialist justifications or arguments

Strawsonian and other arguments against consequentialist justifications of personal responsibility

Deadline abstract and

bio/list of publications

(PDF or plain text):                 April 8th, 2010.

Notification of acceptance:     June 1th, 2010.

Deadline paper:                       September 1st, 2010.

Please send to: vanvoorstvader@fwb.eur.nl

Printversion of this CfP: WorkshopResponsibility.pdf